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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §77-35-26(2)(a) (1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2(3)(i) (1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a criminal
case may take an appeal to the Supreme Court from a final judgment
and conviction for a first degree felony.

Mr. Ramirez was convicted

of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

v

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1.

Did the trial court commit reversible error when it

denied Mr. Ramirez's motion to suppress the identification and
subsequent statements and evidence as fruits of an unlawful seizure?
2.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying

Mr. Ramirez's motion to suppress the identification testimony of
Gerald Wilson inasmuch as it was the product of suggestive showup
procedures and inherently unreliable?
3.

Did the prosecutor's comments in opening statement and

closing argument prejudice Mr. Ramirez's right to a fair trial as
constitutionally guaranteed?
4.

Did insufficient evidence exist to convict Mr. Ramirez

of the crime of Aggravated Robbery?

TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Constitution of the United States, Amendment IV reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV reads in pertinent
part:
Section 1.
. . . No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, §7 reads:
Sec. 7. [Due Process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, §12 reads:
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and

vii

the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment,
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself;
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against
her husbnad, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense.
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, §14 reads:
Sec. 14, [Unreasonable searches forbidden—
Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-30 reads:
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.—(1) A person
commits aggravated robbery if in the course of
committing robbery, he:
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or a
deadly weapon; or
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon
another .
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the
first degree.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act
shall be deemed to be "in the course of committing
a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit,
during the commission of, or in the immediate
flight after the attempt or commission of a
robbery.
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 reads:
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and
question suspect—Grounds. A peace officer may
stop any person in a public place when he has a
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reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed
or is in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his name,
address and an explanation of his actions.

IX

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 880425
Priority No. 2

LIVIO ALPHONSO RAMIREZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Ramirez appeals from a judgment and conviction for
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §76-6-302 (1953 as amended) following a jury trial held
July 11-13, 1988 in the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat,
Judge, presiding.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the early morning hours of August 13, 1987, Kathy
Davis, store manager of the Redwood Road and Sixth North Pizza Hut
was leaving the restaurant accompanied by her husband, John Davis,
and her brother, Gerald Wilson (R. 212 at 26-27).

A man approached

them and, holding a lead pipe, accosted Kathy Davis, demanding she
give him the bank bag containing the day's receipts (R. 212 at
29-30).

Mrs. Davis informed him she didn't have the bag, but he

insisted she give him the money and pushed and shoved her into the
car (R. 212 at 31-32).

Mr. Wilson attempted to restrain the

individual, who then struck him with the pipe and demanded that they
not move (R. 212 at 85-86).

The man then instructed Mrs. Davis to

enter the restaurant, get the money and return (R. 212 at 33-34,
86).

With some difficulty, Mrs. Davis entered the restaurant,

obtained the money and returned (R. 212 at 35-36).
In the interim, Mr. Wilson again attempted to stop the
robber, who then swung the lead pipe but failed to hit Mr. Wilson
only because he struck the drain pipe above Mr. Wilson's head
(R. 212 at 86). He then told Mr. Wilson and Mr. Davis, who also
remained outside the restaurant, that if they were to move, the
other man would shoot them (R. 212 at 86-87).

This reference to a

second individual was the initial recognition of any of the other
parties that a second robber was involved (R. 212 at 47; R. 213 at
44, 65). Both Mr. and Mrs. Davis testified that this individual was
toward the corner of the building in the shadows (R. 212 at 58,
74).

Mr. Wilson, however, testified that he saw the individual for

between mere seconds and one minute, looking him in the face (R. 213
at 45) .
Police officers were then called to investigate the
robbery; Officer Vida Travis of the Salt Lake City Police Department
responded to the call and interviewed witnesses (R. 215 at 2-3).
Mr. Davis described the robber carrying the pipe as a male Mexican
from eighteen to nineteen years old, six feet, slender, short dark
hair, and brown eyes.

He described this man with the pipe as

wearing a white bandana, a red and white baseball cap (R. 215 at
4-5).

He described the second individual as eighteen to nineteen
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years old, five feet six inches tall, slender, brown eyes, Levis,
white bandana over his face, also wearing a red and white baseball
cap and holding a gun or revolver (R. 215 at 4-6).
Mr. Wilson's description given to Officer Travis was that
the man with the pipe was a male Mexican between the ages of
twenty-one to twenty-two, five feet seven to five feet eight inches
tall, one hundred fifty-five to one hundred sixty pounds.

He had

shaggy brown hair, brown eyes, a blue sweater and Levis, and was
wearing a white scarf (R. 215 at 6). Mr. Wilson also testified that
the man with the pipe had one front tooth missing and a bald spot on
one side of his head (R. 215 at 7). Mr. Wilson described the second
individual, the man with the gun, as five feet nine inches to six
feet tall, wearing a blue sweater and Levis, with a white scarf
across his face (R. 215 at 7).
Descriptions were called into police headquarters and a
dispatch was issued for male Mexicans (R. 215 at 8) (see Exhibit 1
attached at Addendum A ) .
Mr. Ramirez is five feet ten inches tall.
hundred sixty pounds.

He weighs one

He is an Apache Indian with some Spanish

heritage and he wears his hair shoulder length due to his Indian
religion.

He has worn his hair the same for five years (R. 212 at

238, 241). Mr. Ramirez speaks no foreign language (R. 212 at 251).
He has three tattoos on his arm—a rose, an "L" and a little drummer
boy—which are all visible when wearing his sleeveless sweatshirt
(R. 212 at 250-51).

Mr. Ramirez has never had a bald spot on his

head, and he has not had a missing tooth since childhood (R. 212 at
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239).

On August 13, 1987, Mr. Ramirez was wearing Levis and a dark

blue sweatshirt with cut-off sleeves with paint splattered all over
the front of it (R. 212 at 173-75).

He was also wearing a brown

baseball cap (R. 212 at 175).
At approximately 1:00 a.m., Police Officer Merrill Stuck
was cruising in his marked police car with headlights off in an area
south of the Pizza Hut, searching for a female runaway (R. 213 at
9).

As he drove up Morton Drive near 650 North, he observed two

individuals whom he believed to be walking together toward him
(R. 213 at 6-8). At a point where he believed the individuals
initially recognized the car as a police cruiser, one of the
individuals took off running (R. 213 at 6). Officer Stuck could not
describe this person other than to say he was wearing a lightcolored shirt (R. 212 at 178-79).

Officer Stuck had been looking

for the female runaway with his radio turned off and was unaware of
the recent Pizza Hut robbery (R. 213 at 10). However, he then
turned on his radio and broadcast that an individual had just run
upon sighting him and that he was going to "shake" another
individual (R. 213 at 14; R. 211 at 6). He then exited his car and
approached the second individual, demanding identification and
explanations (R. 213 at 8, 21). This other individual identified
himself as Mr. Livio Alphonso Ramirez, the Appellant in this case
(R. 213 at 21).
Mr. Ramirez clarified through his testimony that Officer
Stuck exited his car and demanded he stop, place his hands in the
air and that the officer had his hand on his gun (R. 215 at 12).
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Officer Stuck did not recall whether he had ordered Mr. Ramirez to
put his hands up when he first approached him, but he did respond in
pretrial testimony that it was entirely possible that he did so
(R. 213 at 12-13).

Mr. Ramirez also testified that Officer Stuck

handcuffed him with his hands behind his back (R. 215 at 12).
After Officer Stuck had stopped and handcuffed
Mr. Ramirez, a second officer, Officer Robert Rackley, arrived on
the scene (R. 211 at 6). Officer Rackley was out of his patrol
sector, causing Officer Stuck to question why he was present in the
area (R. 213 at 13-14).

Officer Rackley informed Officer Stuck that

a robbery had recently occurred at the Pizza Hut to the north and
that when he heard his broadcast, he decided to assist Officer Stuck
and investigate (R. 213 at 14-15).

Officer Stuck then asked Officer

Rackley if Mr. Ramirez fit the description (R. 213 at 15).
Observing Mr. Ramirez to be of the general ethnic description of
Hispanic, Officer Rackley confirmed that Mr. Ramirez fit the general
description (R. 211 at 8; R. 213 at 15). At that point, no
discussion occurred as to the description of either the pipe man or
the gun man, but Mr. Ramirez was then handcuffed to the fence and
arrangements were made to bring witnesses to this scene for
identification purposes (R. 211 at 11; R. 213 at 16). Mr. Ramirez
was viewed by the witnesses from the back seat of the police cars
with the headlights of several police cars shining on him and with
several officers standing around him (R. 213 at 52-53).

Police

officers also informed each of the witnesses that a suspect had been
found which fit their descriptions (R. 213 at 49-51, 59, 68-69).
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Although the record is somewhat confusing as to which
witness arrived first for the showup and/or whether they arrived
together, the record discloses that neither Kathy Davis nor her
husband, John Davis, could identify Mr. Ramirez as either of the
robbers (R. 213 at 49-50, 59, 61-62, 69). Mr. Wilson, however, did
identify for police officers Mr. Ramirez as the man he saw holding
the gun (R. 213 at 51). Mr. Ramirez was subsequently taken into
custody and charged with Aggravated Robbery (R. 3).
Pretrial motions were filed by Mr. Ramirez, moving to
suppress the identification of him by Mr. Wilson inasmuch as the
procedures used by the police officers were unduly suggestive
(R. 49-50).

Mr. Ramirez further moved that all evidence including

the identification by Mr. Wilson obtained by police officers against
Mr. Ramirez should be suppressed inasmuch as such evidence was
obtained in violation of Mr. Ramirez's rights against unreasonable
search and seizure as guaranteed by both the federal and state
constitutions (R. 47-48).
Extensive hearings were conducted on these two pretrial
motions over several days (R. 211, 213, 215). At the conclusion of
the testimony, Mr. Ramirez again moved to suppress the
identification and any and all statements by Mr. Ramirez as fruits
of an unlawful seizure as well as moving to suppress the actual
identification testimony of Mr. Wilson itself as a product of an
unconstitutional showup (R. 215 at 26). Both motions were denied by
the trial court (R. 85, 87-88).
Prior to trial, counsel renewed both motions and asked

- 6 -

for a continuing objection to any and all evidence introduced
contrary to the suppression motion (R. 212 at 2-3). The trial court
granted the continuing objection (R. 212 at 3).
Prior to trial, Mr. Ramirez moved the trial court to
limit the argument of counsel for the State to avoid any discussion
of crime in general or prior crimes of this particular Pizza Hut
(R. 212 at 5-8). The Court withheld ruling on the motion (R. 212 at
8).

Mr. Ramirez later objected to remarks made by the prosecutor in

both his opening statement and his closing arguments and moved for a
mistrial and new trial respectively (R. 212 at 18-19; R. 214).
Transcripts of the closing argument were prepared and a hearing held
on that motion; counsel also renewed the pretrial motions as motions
for a new trial (R. 214). Following argument by both counsel, the
trial court denied the motion for a new trial (R. 172-73).
Mr. Ramirez now appeals his conviction.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Police Officer Stuck violated Mr. Ramirez's rights as
protected by the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution when he stopped and frisked Mr. Ramirez without a
reasonable articulable suspicion.

The evidence acquired as fruits

of that unlawful search and seizure, including the subsequent
identification by Gerald Wilson, must therefore be suppressed,
requiring a reversal of the conviction and a new trial.
Mr. Ramirez was identified by witness'Gerald Wilson
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pursuant to suggestive police procedures which rendered the
identification unreliable and mandates reversal of the conviction
and a new trial.
The prosecutor's remarks in his opening statement and
closing arguments to the jury were inappropriate and jeopardized
Mr. Ramirez's right to a fundamentally fair trial.

The remarks

likely altered the outcome of the jury's verdict demanding that the
conviction be reversed and a new trial granted.
Insufficient evidence exists to sustain Mr. Ramirez's
conviction for armed robbery, requiring that the conviction be
reversed and the trial court ordered to dismiss the charges against
him.

ARGUMENT

POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO GRANT THE MOTION TO
SUPPRESS ALL EVIDENCE WHICH FOLLOWED THE UNLAWFUL
SEIZURE OF MR. RAMIREZ.
Prior to trial, Mr. Ramirez filed a motion to suppress
the identification and subsequent statements and evidence acquired
against him as fruits of an unlawful seizure which violated his
state and federal constitutional rights (R. 47-48).

Extensive

pretrial testimony was introduced over three separate hearings held
March 18, 1988; May 12, 1988; and May 31, 1988 (R. 213, 211, and 215
respectively).

Following the testimony, arguments were presented to

the trial court by respective counsel (R. 215 at 50-69).
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The trial

court took the motion under advisement (R. 215 at 69) but later
denied Mr. Ramirez's motion (R. 87-88).

At the start of trial,

Mr. Ramirez renewed his motion and requested a continuing objection
to any and all evidence introduced pursuant to the illegal seizure
(R. 212 at 2-3). The trial court granted the continuing objection
(R. 212 at 3). Following the trial and conviction of Mr. Ramirez,
he filed a motion for a new trial, requesting the court to
reconsider the motion to suppress (R. 163-64, R. 214, September 21,
1988 hearing at 2-3). The trial court denied the new trial motion
(R. 172-74).

Mr. Ramirez now asserts that the trial court committed

prejudicial error in failing to grant the motions and in finding the
stop by Officer Stuck to be within constitutional strictures.
The fourth and fourteenth amendments of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution
mandate that a person may not be detained by law enforcement
personnel, even momentarily, without reasonable and objective
grounds for doing so.

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1953);

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 344, 353-54 (1980).
Otherwise, a seizure of the person occurs.
1, 16 (1968).

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

Such a seizure is constitutionally justifiable only

when an objective articulable suspicion exists that the person
seized has committed or is about to commit a crime.

Florida v.

Royer, 460 U.S. at 498; Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980);
State v, Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985).
The State argued against the motion to suppress and the
subsequent motion for a new trial, claiming the actions of police
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officers in this case were justified as a police-citizen encounter
rather than as a Terry-stop.

By labeling the police officers1

actions as an encounter rather than a stop, the prosecutor avoided
the body of law referenced above as well as the Utah Legislature's
codification of the principles recognized in that body of law found
at Utah Code Ann, §77-7-15 (1953 as amended)1.

An examination of

the facts of this case requires that this Court reject that argument
and remand this case to the trial court, ordering a new trial with
the suppression motion granted.
At approximately 1:00 o'clock in the morning of
August 13, 1987, Officer Stuck of the Salt Lake Police Department
was in uniform driving his marked police cruiser on Morton Drive
near 600 North in Salt Lake County (R. 213 at 5-6). Officer Stuck
was driving northbound with both the headlights and the police radio
of the police cruiser turned off and was in the process of looking
for a female runaway (R. 213 at 6, 10). He observed two men on the
east side of Morton Drive walking in his direction (R. 213 at 6).
The officer indicated that when it appeared to him that the two men
saw him, one of them ran eastbound on 600 North (R. 213 at 6). The
second man, Mr. Ramirez, continued southbound on Morton Drive,
crossing the intersection of 600 North to the southeast corner of

1

Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended) states:
77-7-15. Authority of Peace Officer to Stop and Question Suspect—
Grounds. A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when
he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in
the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense
and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions.
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Morton Drive and 600 North (R. 213 at 8). Officer Stuck further
indicated that when he saw the one man run away, he sped up a bit
and then stopped Mr. Ramirez (R. 213 at 8). In the process, he
turned on his radio and notified dispatch that a person had run from
him and that he was investigating a pedestrian (R. 213 at 14). The
officer testified that he then pulled up to Mr. Ramirez, got out of
his car, approached Mr. Ramirez, and asked him for identification
(R. 213 at 8).
Although Officer Stuck was unaware of any burglary
reports, car prowls or crimes of any nature in that immediate
vicinity that night (R. 213 at 8-9), he articulated that he stopped
Mr. Ramirez and asked him for identification because "he had been
with another man who ran from me, and at 1:00 o'clock in the morning
in an area that had a very high incidence of night-time residential
burglary and car prowls" (R. 213 at 8). The officer indicated that
Mr. Ramirez had not done anything other than his being present in
the area at that hour which caused him to stop Mr. Ramirez (R. 213
at 9) .
At the suppression hearing, Mr. Ramirez testified that
after the other individual had run, Police Officer Stuck exited his
car and hollered at him to hold it; he testified the officer had
his hands placed on his gun (R. 215 at 12). Mr. Ramirez
subsequently testified that he was then frisked and handcuffed by
Officer Stuck (R. 215 at 12-13).

While Officer Stuckfs testimony at

the pretrial hearing suggests that the frisk and the handcuffing
occurred at a much later time than the initial moment advocated by
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Mr. Ramirez, the totality of his testimony during the pretrial
hearings and at trial indicates the contentions of Mr. Ramirez to be
correct.

Specifically, when Officer Stuck was asked by counsel

whether he ordered Mr. Ramirez to hold his hands up when he first
approached him, he answered, "I don't recall if I did.

It's

entirely possible" (R. 213 at 8-9). Further, while Officer Stuck
testified at the pretrial hearing that he did not pat down or cuff
Mr. Ramirez until after Officer Rackley arrived, he indicated
unequivocally during his trial testimony that he had patted down
Mr. Ramirez searching for identification prior to the arrival of
Officer Rackley.

Compare R. 213 at 15 with R. 212 at 156-57.

Also noteworthy is that Officer Stuck testified at the
pretrial hearing that Mr. Ramirez, after being stopped, was backed
up against a fence (R. 213 at 9 ) , where Officer Rackley, the second
officer at the scene, later strung a second set of handcuffs through
the initial set already on his wrists, handcuffing Mr. Ramirez to
the fence (R. 212 at 16-17).

Moreover, the testimony of Officer

Rackley buttresses the conclusion that the stop was in violation of
constitutional requirements and Utah statutory provisions. He
testified that Officer Stuck had in fact intended to conduct a stop
of Mr. Ramirez rather than a police-citizen encounter as witnessed
by the dispatch of Officer Stuck.

Officer Rackley testified that he

had "heard Officer Stuck call out on a guy that was running, that he
stopped somebody, was on a shakedown" (R. 211 at 6).
While counsel and the trial judge spent considerable time
in the pretrial motion discussing events occurring after the arrival
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of Officer Rackley, Mr. Ramirez contends for purposes of this appeal
that those events are irrelevant to this issue.

The United States

Supreme Court opinions of Terry v. Ohio and its progeny require that
a "stop" and "frisk" of an individual must necessarily be justified
at inception and in scope.

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20;

United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682.

The actions of Officer

Stuck in this case were justified neither at inception nor in
scope.

Case law, both federal and from this jurisdiction, reveals

that the officer's behavior was devoid of any reasonable articulable
suspicion to justify the stop of Mr. Ramirez.

The United States

Supreme Court in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979), stated that
location alone was insufficient to justify a Terry-stop.
indicated that:

The Court

"[ijn the absence of any basis for suspecting

appellant of misconduct, the balance between the public interest and
the appellant's right to personal security and privacy tilts in
favor of freedom from police intervention."

_I_d. That a police

officer has a duty to investigate citizens walking in the early
morning hours is a stretch of the role police play in our society.
Such a duty only attaches when a reasonable basis exists for the
officer "in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner
[to] approach a person for purposes of investigating possible
criminal behavior . . . "

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 22.

The Utah Legislature has indicated in statute that the
Utah constitutional provision against unreasonable searches and
seizures similarly requires more of police officers before impinging
on the privacy rights of individuals.
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Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953

as amended).

Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 requires that before a police

officer stops a person in a public place, he must have a reasonable
suspicion to believe that a crime has been committed or is about to
be committed and this reasonable suspicion must exist prior to when
that officer demands identification from the individual.

Utah case

law unsurprisingly agrees with that premise.
in State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), a police
officer stopped two men walking near the scene of a burglary.
officer told the men to stop and asked for identification.

The

A backup

officer arrived and the officers phoned in a warrants check.

This

Court considered the officer's action to be a seizure and held that
the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion based on objective
facts to justify the stop.
in State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), an
officer approached defendants in an all-night laundromat at
1:00 a.m.

The officer asked the individuals for identification and

what they were doing there.

This Court held that "there was no

improper seizure or detention in the questioning.11
(emphasis added).

Ic^. at 105

There was "no improper seizure" because the

officer articulated reasonable objective facts upon which he based
that stop.

Id.
Thus, in both Swanigan and Whittenback, this Court

considered the stop a seizure requiring reasonable articulable
suspicion.

See, also, State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986),

and State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408 (Utah 1984).

These rulings

comport with §77-7-15 and the Legislature's statutory interpretation
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of the Utah constitutional provision, Article I, Section 14,
limiting the intrusion into an individual's privacy by police
personnel.

The Utah Court of Appeals has similarly ruled.

See

State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987).
On the facts of the case at bar, no reasonable suspicion
existed for Officer Stuck to stop Mr. Ramirez in the early morning
hours of August 13, 1988. On Officer Stuck's own admission,
Mr. Ramirez had not done anything to arouse suspicion other than be
in that neighborhood at one ofclock in the morning (R. 213 at 9).'
Officer Stuck was unaware of the Pizza Hut robbery, or any car
prowls, or any burglary reports, or crimes of any nature when he
stopped Mr. Ramirez.

Yet, the officer demanded that Mr. Ramirez

stop and then immediately requested identification from him, and he
searched him for identification when none was proffered (R. 212 at
156-57).

Therefore, the stop of Mr. Ramirez exceeded the

permissible behavior as outlined by §77-7-15, Utah case law, and
federal case law in that the stop of Mr. Ramirez was not reasonable
at its inception.
Moreover, the stop of Mr. Ramirez was per se unreasonable
in scope.

The federal constitution and the constitution of Utah

both mandate that in the stop and frisk situation, an officer may
only pat down the suspect when in fear of his personal safety or
that of others.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Sibron v.

New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).

In Sibron v. New York, the United

States Supreme Court stated:
The police officer is not entitled to seize and
search every person whom he sees on the street or
- 15 -

of whom he makes inquiries. Before he places a
hand on the person of a citizen in search of
anything, he must have constitutionally adequate,
reasonable grounds for doing so. In the case of
the self-protective search for weapons, he must be
able to point to particular facts from which he
reasonably inferred that the individual was armed
and dangerous.
392 U.S. at 64.

In this case, Officer Stuck indicated that he

searched Mr. Ramirez for identification after Mr. Ramirez told him
he had none.

That frisk was in direct contravention of

constitutional strictures and was per se unreasonable in scope.
Because Officer Stuck was unable to articulate a
reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of Mr. Ramirez, the stop
was not reasonable at inception; because he searched Mr. Ramirez
without a constitutionally valid basis, the stop was not reasonable
in scope.

It follows therefore that the federal and state

constitutional rights of Mr. Ramirez were violated.

Accordingly,

the fruits which followed the unreasonable seizure of Mr. Ramirez
must be suppressed in accordance with the law outlined in Terry v.
Ohio and as required by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
Before proceeding to the additional issues of this appeal,
Mr. Ramirez makes the following observations on the theory of the
policy-citizen encounter and urges its inapplicability to the case
at bar.

In the case of State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, the concept

of the police-citizen encounter was acknowledged by this Court.
However, Mr. Ramirez respectfully requests that this Court
reconsider its adoption of the police-citizen encounter for several

- 16 -

reasons:

First, in this state, the statutory reference found at

Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 establishes the requirements police officers
must meet prior to demanding identification or questioning
individuals.

The police-citizen encounter as now outlined in

State v. Deitman ignores the statutory requirements of Utah Code
Ann. §77-7-15.

Secondly, the per curiam opinion of State v. Deitman

is ill-founded.

In Deitman, this Court cited United States v.

Merritt, 736 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1984), for the proposition that
police-citizen encounters have been sanctioned by the United States
Supreme Court.

A brief review of the facts in Merritt, however,

discloses that the cited language relied on in State v. Deitman is
pure dicta.

In Merritt, federal and state officials stopped a

vessel later found to contain drugs.

The government never argued

this was a police-citizen encounter; rather, the government
consistently and successfully argued that the investigatory stop was
supported by an articulable suspicion that the vessel was engaged in
drug trafficking.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that

the stop was valid under Terry v. Ohio standards.

Merritt, 736 F.2d

at 230. The cited language was surplusage in Merritt and is
surplusage in Deitman, and this Court should refrain from continuing
the erroneous reliance on State v. Deitman.
Third, and most important for this appeal, even if this
Court refuses to retreat from the position advanced in State v.
Deitman, the factual peculiarities existing in Deitman do not exist
in this case, and the police-citizen encounter is therefore
distinguishable from the occurrences therein.
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In State v. Deitman,

police officers remained in their automobile and asked the
defendants in that case whether they would mind speaking with them.
This Court stated:

In Deitman, "defendants were not stopped by the

officer and raised no objection when the officer asked if he could
talk to them.

They crossed the street, produced identification on

request, and were not detained against their will."

Moreover, the

request of identification and explanation of their presence in the
area was permissible solely because the police were investigating
and responding to a burglary.

In this case, Officer Stuck was not

aware of any crime and he did not ask Mr. Ramirez if he would mind
talking to him; he stopped Mr. Ramirez, approached Mr. Ramirez, and
demanded identification.

As State v. Deitman is, at a minimum,

distinguishable from the facts in the case at bar, as well as
State v. Swanigan and State v. Whittenback cited above, the
police-citizen encounter theory is inappropriate to this case and
should play no role.
Accordingly, Mr. Ramirez requests this Court to find
violations of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search
and seizure and to remand his case for a new trial where the
evidence obtained by virtue of those violations is suppressed.

POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO SUPPRESS THE IDENTIFICATION
TESTIMONY OF GERALD WILSON AS THE PRODUCT OF
SUGGESTIVE SHOWUP PROCEDURES.
Prior to trial, Mr. Ramirez filed a motion to suppress the
eyewitness identification testimony of Gerald Wilson inasmuch as
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that identification of him was the product of unconstitutional
suggestive showup procedures (R. 49-50).

Extensive pretrial

testimony was introduced over three separate hearings held March 18,
1988; May 12, 1988; and May 31, 1988 (R. 213, 211 and 215
respectively).

Following the testimony, arguments were presented by

Mr. Ramirez in support of the motion to suppress (R. 215 at 26).
The trial court denied that motion (R. 87-88).

At trial,

Mr. Ramirez requested a continuing objection to all such
identification testimony by Gerald Wilson (R. 212 at 2-3). The
trial court granted the continuing objection (R. 212 at 3).
Following the trial and conviction of Mr. Ramirez, he filed a motion
for a new trial, again asserting that the procedures utilized by
police officers to obtain identification testimony against him were
unnecesssarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification (R. 163-64; R. 214, September 21, 1988 hearing at
2-3).

The trial court denied the motion for a new trial

(R. 172-74).

Mr. Ramirez now urges on appeal that the trial court's

reluctance and failure to grant his motions was contrary to
constitutional protections afforded by state and federal due process
requirements and that his conviction should therefore be reversed
and a new trial ordered.
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court authored three
opinions examining the viability of eyewitness identification
procedures, finding substantial concerns with those procedures and
the resulting testimony.

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218

(1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); and Stovall v.

- 19 -

Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).

Several of the Court's observations

merit attention before consideration of this case now at bar.

In

United States v. Wade, the Court noted:
The vagaries of eyewitness identification are
well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife
with instances of mistaken identification.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter once said: "What is the
worth of identification testimony even when
uncontradicted? The identification of strangers is
proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards of such
testimony are established by a formidable number of
instances in the records of English and American
trials. These instances are recent—not due to the
brutalities of ancient criminal procedure."* A"
major factor contributing to the high incidence of
miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification
has been a degree of suggestion inherent in the
manner in which the prosecution presents the
suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification.
A commentator has observed that "[t]he influence of
improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses
probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice
than any other single factor—perhaps it is
responsible for more such errors than all other
factors combined." Suggestion can be created
intentionally or unintentionally in many subtle
ways. And the dangers for the suspect are
particularly grave when the witness1 opportunity
for observation was insubstantial, and thus his
susceptibility to suggestion the greatest.
Moreover, "[i]t is a matter of common
experience that, once a witness has picked out the
accused at the line-up, he is not likely to go back
on his word later on, so that in practice the issue
of identity may (in the absence of other relevant
evidence) for all practical purposes be determined
there and then, before the trial."
388 U.S. at 228-29 (footnotes omitted; citations omitted).

Of

particular significance to the practice employed by the officers in
this case—the one-person showup—the Court has commented that:
[t]he practice of showing suspects singly to
persons for the purpose of identification, and not
part of a lineup, has been widely condemned.
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Stovall v, Denno, 388 U.S. at 303.
Since this trilogy of United States Supreme Court cases,
this Court has yet to address a single-person showup procedure and
rule on the acceptability of that process.

This Court, however, has

authored opinions addressing problems of similar suggestive
practices.

In State v. Perry, 492 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Utah 1972), this

Court stated:
[T]he circumstances of the individual case should
be scrutinized carefully by the trial court to see
whether the identification procedures there was
anything done which should be regarded as so
suggestive or persuasive that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the identification was not a
genuine product of the knowledge and recollection
of the witness but was something so distorted or
tainted that in fairness and justness the guilt or
innocence of an accused should not be allowed to be
tested thereby.
Later that same year, the United States Supreme Court advanced five
factors for trial courts to apply in considering such issues.

In

Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), the Court reaffirmed the
Stovall v. Denno "totality of the circumstances" standard to
determine the reliability of suggestive identification procedures
under due process challenges.

The Court announced the five factors

for consideration as (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the
criminal at the time of the crime, (2) the witness1 degree of
attention, (3) the accuracy of the witness1 prior description of the
criminal, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at
the confrontation, and (5) the length of time between the crime and
the confrontation.

Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199.

Following Neil v. Biggers, this Court adopted the
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five-factor analysis.

See State v. Newton, 657 P.2d 759 (Utah

1983); State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982); State v.
Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289 (Utah 1982); and State v. Malmrose, 649
P.2d 56 (Utah 1982).

More recently, however, this Court has

criticized the five factors announced in Neil v. Biggers as outdated
noting, n[S]everal of the criteria listed by the Court are based on
assumptions that are flatly contradicted by well-respected and
essentially unchallenged empirical studies."
P.2d 483, 491 (Utah 1986).

State v. Long, 721

Critical for this appeal, the Long Court

notably singled out the "level of certainty" factor in Neil v.
Biggers stating:
Research has also undermined the common notion that
the confidence with which an individual makes an
identification is a valid indicator of the accuracy
of the recollection. In fact, the accuracy of an
identification is, at times, inversely related to
the confidence with which it is made.
721 P.2d at 490 (citations omitted).

In suggesting valid

considerations for determining the accuracy of eyewitness testimony,
this Court replaced the dated "level of certainty" factor with the
consideration of "whether the witness1 identification was made
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was
the product of suggestion."

721 P.2d at 483.

The opinion authored by this Court in State v. Long
notably coincides with the earlier pre-Neil v. Biggers opinion of
State v. Perry where the Utah Supreme Court's focus was more
squarely placed on an examination of the suggestiveness of the
procedures utilized to obtain the eyewitness testimony.
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See

State v. Perry, 492 P.2d at 1352. Mr. Ramirez accordingly urges
that this Court retreat from the use of the five factors announced
in Neil v. Biggers and employ the more current considerations
approved by this Court in State v. Long consistent with the prior
premise of State v. Perry.

Alternatively, Mr. Ramirez urges that,

at a minimum, this Court should include the recently recognized
factors in the examination of the totality of the circumstances.
Therefore, for purposes of this appeal, Mr. Ramirez will brief all
relevant considerations, urging that the circumstances under the
dated Neil v. Biggers test, with or without the more current
State v. Long examination, require that his conviction be reversed.
A reiteration of the facts discloses that the factors
balance in favor of Mr. Ramirez.

Although the entire robbery took

about ten minutes, Mr. Wilson testified that he didn't even know the
gunman was present until after the point that the man with the pipe
had struck him in the stomach (R. 213 at 44-45).

Only when

Mr. Wilson attempted to again take the pipe from the first robber
and the first robber spoke to the gunman did Mr. Wilson realize a
second robber was present (R. 213 at 44). On cross-examination of
Mr. Wilson, defense counsel queried:
Q: You think the whole robbery took about ten
minutes?
A: Yes.
Q: And so out of that time was it maybe one-half
of that time or less that you saw the one with the
gun that you were aware of?
A: It was only about a minute I seen the guy with
the gun. Just a matter of seconds I saw the guy.
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(R. 213 at 45). Following the robbery, police officers arrived
within ten minutes and took statements from the three victims
(R. 213 at 45). Mrs. Davis, like her brother, was unaware of the
presence of the gunman until the man with the pipe had directed the
attention to him (R. 213 at 65). While she testified that the
lighting in the area was generally bright, she indicated that the
man with the gun was standing in a shadowy area (R. 212 at 58). She
was therefore unable to give a description of the gunman (R. 213 at
65).

Mr. Davis testified that he didn't really see the gunman,

primarily because the man with the gun was standing back in a
shadowy area (R. 213 at 70, R. 212 at 63). He later stated that he
could not get a good look at the individual and could only see a
vague image oE the person with the gun (R. 212 at 74). However,
Mr. Davis did give a description of the gunman, who he described as
eighteen or nineteen years old, five feet six inches tall, slender,
brown eyes, wearing Levis, and with a white bandana over his face.
He also indicated that the robber with the gun had a red and white
cap and was holding a gun (R. 215 at 6).
Mr. Wilson testified that the area was well lit, though
without direct lighting and that he viewed the man with the gun for
somewhere between a matter of seconds and a minute with no one in
between them (R. 213 at 43, 45). Later at trial, he contradicted
his own testimony when he indicated that the man with the pipe was
actually standing between him and the man with the gun (R. 212 at
44).

Mr. Wilson gave descriptions of both robbers to the police

officers within minutes of their arrival.
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To Officer Travis,

Mr, Wilson gave the description of the man with the pipe as a male
Mexican, between twenty-one and twenty-two years old, five feet
seven to five feet eight, 155 to 160 pounds, shaggy brown hair,
brown eyes, blue sweater and Levis.
scarf.

He was also wearing a white

Mr. Wilson also testified that the man with the pipe had one

front tooth missing and a bald spot on one side of his head (R. 215
at 6-7). Regarding the gunman, Mr. Wilson testified that he also
was a male Mexican, five feet nine inches to six feet tall, was
wearing a blue sweater and Levis, with a white scarf across his
face, and holding a revolver (R. 215 at 7 ) .
Moments later, witnesses were alerted by the police
officers that a suspect had been located several blocks away and
that the police would take the witnesses to that location to
identify the suspect (R. 213 at 15-16).

The record reveals some

confusion as to which witness veiwed Mr. Ramirez first and whether
witnesses viewed Mr. Ramirez together (R. 213 at 49-50, 59, 61-62,
69).

The record is quite clear, however, that the police officers

told the witnesses that they had a suspect that fit the description
(R. 213 at 49-51, 59, 68-69).

When pressed by defense counsel for a

more accurate recollection of the comments by the police officer,
Mr. Wilson stated:

"The police officer told me 'I've found a man

that fit one of the descriptions.
Mr. Wilson responded:
50).

"Yes, I can.

I'll come with you" (R. 213 at

On arrival to the spot where Mr. Ramirez was being held, the

police officer asked Mr. Wilson:
it?"

Can you come and identify him?'"

Mr. Wilson said:

"Is this one of the men that did

"That was the man with the gun" (R. 213 at
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51).

Mr. Ramirez was viewed by Mr. Wilson, who sat in the back seat

of the police car, while Mr. Ramirez was handcuffed behind his back
and handcuffed to a fence with several police officers standing
around him; headlights of the police cars were used to supply the
light for the identification (R. 213 at 51-53).
Both other victims were also taken by police officers to
view Mr. Ramirez, though, as indicated above, neither of these
witnesses claimed to have obtained a good enough description of the
defendant to identify him because of his presence in a shadowy
area.

Neither victim identified Mr. Ramirez as either of the

robbers.

Mr. Davis recalls the police officer saying:

suspect that we think is the one that did it."

"We have a

Despite that

suggestive introduction and despite Mr. Davis1 prior description of
the gunman, he could not identify Mr. Ramirez as the robber with the
gun.
The above recitation of the facts indicates that, under an
examination of the totality of the circumstances, Mr. Wilson's
identification of Livio Ramirez was suspect and gives rise to a
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 at 384.

See

In particular, the

evidence above indicates that Mr. Wilson's opportunity to view
Mr. Ramirez was quite limited.

By his own testimony, it was only a

matter of seconds to a minute that he saw the man with the gun. At
one point, he indicated there was no one in his view, but he later
testified that the pipe man was between him and the gunman.

While

conceding that Mr. Wilson's degree of attention must have been
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heightened during this very short time frame, the facts also
disclose that, once alerted to the presence of the gunman, the pipe
man again swung at Mr. Wilson, missing him only because the pipe
struck the rain gutter above his head.

These facts indicate that

Mr. Wilson's degree of attention over those few seconds was divided
among the gunman, the pipe man, and his concern for his sister, who
was being pushed and ordered to reenter the Pizza Hut to obtain the
day's receipts.
Examining the accuracy of Mr. Wilson's prior description
of the gunman reveals that the original description was incredibly
generic.

This is especially visible when contrasting this

description of the gunman Mr. Wilson gave Police Officer Travis with
the description he gave her regarding the suspect with the pipe.
Regarding the man with the pipe, Mr. Wilson offered details such as
one front tooth was missing, a bald spot on the side of his head,
brown eyes, shaggy brown hair, weight, etc.

Regarding the man with

the gun, Mr. Wilson's description was limited to male Mexican, blue
sweater and Levis, white scarf across the face.
Further revealing the inaccuracy of Mr. Wilson's prior
description is the testimony he offered later at the pretrial
hearing on the motion to suppress and then again at the trial. The
testimony offered at those hearings was much more detailed the
description given mere moments after the event when questioned by
Police Officer Travis.

Notably, the presence of detail in

Mr. Wilson's description of the gunman was forthcoming only after he
was taken by police officers to see Mr. Ramirez handcuffed to the
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fence surrounded by police officers and after seeing Mr. Ramirez in
the courtroom setting of a preliminary hearing.

Only then was

Mr. Wilson able to give such persuasive details such as a
tattoo—which is as significant for visual sighting as is a bald
spot on the side of the head or a missing front tooth—and the
particular description of the long hair and the particular nature of
the eyes.
The improved detail of identification testimony is
probably best explained by reiterating a comment by the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Wade.

There the Court

noted:
It is a matter of common experience that,
once a witness has picked out the accused at the
[showup], he is not likely to go back on his word
later on, so that in practice the issue of identity
may (in the absence of other relevant evidence) for
all practical purposes be determined there and
then, before the trial.
388 U.S. at 229 (citation omitted).

Additionally, this Court has

also recognized common human frailties which render suspect
Mr. Wilson's recollection of more and more details as the criminal
process progressed.

This Court offered the explanation:

Another mechanism we all develop to compensate for
our inability to receive all aspects of an event at
once is a series of logical inferences: if we see
one thing, we assume, based on our past experience,
that we also saw another that ordinarily follows.
This way we can "perceive" a whole event in our
mind's eye when we have actually seen or heard only
portions of it.
State v. Long, 721 P.2d at 489 (citation omitted).

This Court

compared this problem of compensating through logical inferences
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with the similar problems of selective perception and perceiving
through expectations, prejudices and biases. J^d.

All of these

concerns offer explanations for Mr. Wilson's improved
identifications and also offer reasons for this Court to reject as
inherently unreliable the accuracy of Mr. Wilson's identification of
Mr. Ramirez as the gunman in the Pizza Hut robbery.
Mr. Wilson admittedly appeared throughout the
identification process to be very certain that Mr. Ramirez was the
man with the gun.

As indicated above, his level of certainty

increased at each identification hearing.

This Court in State v.

Long recognized that the level of certainty or confidence with which
an individual makes an identification is often inversely related to
the accuracy of the recollection and identification.

Moreover, the

Long Court cited numerous empirical studies which recognize the
human frailties with eyewitness identification, suggesting that many
times witnesses fill in facts and details to complete their prior
identification.

The testimony of Mr. Wilson throughout this case is

a text book example of an individual who honestly wants to do the
right thing to protect his sister and to defend his original
identification while doing his duty to society as well.
The length of time between the crime and the confrontation
is always a critical factor in the Neil v. Biggers analysis.

In

this case, the length of time between the actual robbery and the
presentation of Mr. Ramirez to the witnesses was within an hour.
However, this factor, like those above, is not dispositive of the
issue and, when balanced with the other factors, offers little
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support that Mr. Wilson's identification testimony is credible.
Again, Mr. Ramirez notes that most of the detail of Mr. Wilson's
in-court testimony regarding the description of the gunman was
obtained after this initial confrontation, and Mr. Ramirez urges
this Court to focus on the initial description of Mr. Wilson given
moments after the event and the physical characteristics of
Mr. Ramirez himself to negate the short time period which passed
between the actual crime and this initial confrontation.
In State v. Long, this Court criticized several of the
factors discussed above, indicating that in particular the level of
certainty factor enunciated in Neil v. Biggers is of little utility
and should be replaced with considerations of whether the witness
identification was spontaneous and consistent or whether it was a
product of suggestion.

Examining the consistency and/or suggestive

nature of the confrontation discloses that it is highly questionable
whether Mr. Wilson's in-court testimony was a product of the
observations at the scene of the robbery.

Rather, the facts

strongly suggest the identification of Mr. Ramirez was a product of
the methods employed by police officers to obtain that
identification testimony, to wit:

the one-person showup moments

after the robbery encouraged by suggestive questioning and
suggestive presentation.
Case law supports that what occurred in this case reduces
the trustworthiness of the subsequent in-court testimony.

The

United States Supreme Court stated in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 303 (1967), that "[t]he practice of showing suspects singly to
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persons for the purpose of identification and not part of a lineup,
has been widely condemned."

The rationale for this judicial

condemnation has been admirably expressed in an analogous situation,
a one-person photo showup, by the United States Supreme Court in
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), where the Court
stated:
This danger [that the witness will make an
incorrect identification] will be increased if the
police display to the witness only the picture of a
single individual who generally resembles the
person he saw, or if they show him the pictures of
several persons among which the photograph of a
single such individual recurs or is someway
emphasized. The chance of misidentification is
also heightened if the police indicate to the
witness that they have other evidence that one of
the persons pictured committed the crime.
Regardless of how the initial misidentification
comes about, the witness thereafter is apt to
retain in his memory the image of the photograph
rather than of the person actually seen, reducing
the trustworthiness of the subsequent lineup or
courtroom identification.
Id. at 383-84.

The police officers in this case accompanied

Mr. Wilson, either alone or with his sister, to the location where
police offices were holding Mr. Ramirez.

Enroute to the location,

police officers informed Mr. Wilson they had a suspect that fit his
earlier description.

Mr. Wilson recalls the officer's statement as

"I found a man that fit one of the descriptions.
identify him?n
reiterated:

Can you come and

Arriving at the location, the police officer

"is this one of the men that did it?"

Supporting the

suggestiveness of that confrontational showup was that Mr. Ramirez
was not in the course of a normal routine but was presented as a
criminal inasmuch" as he was handcuffed behind his back and then to a
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fence and was guarded by police officers.

Such a presentation to a

witness is impermissibly suggestive and in violation of
constitutional due process strictures.
The United States Supreme Court's observation in United
States v. Wade is applicable to this case.
The influence of improper suggestion upon
identifying the witness probably accounts for more
miscarriages of justice than any other single
factor—perhaps it is responsible for more such
errors than all other factors combined."
388 U.S. at 228. Mr. Ramirez urges this Court -to find the
eyewitness identification of Mr. Gerald Wilson to be
unconstitutionally unreliable, requiring that his conviction be
reversed and his case remanded for a new trial.

POINT III. THE MISCONDUCT OF THE PROSECUTOR
PREJUDICED MR. RAMIREZ AND DENIED HIM HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL, THEREBY
REQUIRING REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTION.
Both the state and federal constitutions guarantee
Mr. Ramirez, as they do any accused, the fundamental right to a fair
trial.

Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution; Article I,

Sections 7 and 12, Utah Constitution.

Prosecutors have as much of a

duty to ensure the defendant receives a fair trial as they do to win
cases.

This Court has noted:
We have previously stated that the State
while charged with vigorously enforcing the laws
has a duty to not only secure appropriate
convictions, but an even higher duty to see that
justice is done. In his role as the Statefs
representative in criminal matters the prosecutor,
therefore, must not only attempt to win cases, but
must see that justice is done. Thus, while he
should prosecute with earnestness and vigor, it is
- 32 -

as much his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it
is to use every legitimate means to bring about a
just one.
Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981) (quotations and
citations omitted); accord Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935).

In this case, the prosecutor violated the above tenets in

both his opening statement and his closing arguments to the jury,
and Mr. Ramirez therefore urges that the resulting conviction must
be reversed.
At the beginning of trial, Mr. Ramirez moved the trial
court to limit certain testimony which had revealed itself during
the pretrial hearings that would be inappropriate for the jury to
hear at a trial phase.

In particular, Mr. Ramirez moved that all

discussion designating the area of Mr. Ramirez's arrest as a high
crime area be kept from reaching the jury inasmuch as it is
subjective in nature, not relevant to the issues, and prejudicial to
Mr. Ramirez (R. 212 at 5-6). Similarly, Mr. Ramirez urged that
testimony regarding the fact that this particular Pizza Hut had been
robbed four times over a two-month period manifested a visible
problem in the community with crime and also should not reach the
jury (R. 212 at 7 ) . This information was prejudicial to Mr. Ramirez
inasmuch as an inference could be made that he and the alleged
co-conspirator might be responsible for more than just this robbery
(R. 212 at 5-8). The prosecutor responded to both concerns of
Mr. Ramirez, indicating he had no intention of bringing up the
matters (R. 212 at 6, 8). Based on the argument of counsel and the
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proffers by the prosecutor, the court left open the decision whether
to suppress this material allowing it to be dealt with as it arose
during the course of trial (R. 212 at 8).
The above concern articulated pretrial by Mr. Ramirez
revealed itself during closing arguments of counsel when the
prosecutor argued:
Wouldn't it be nice if on all Pizza Huts and
all other institutions there would be a camera
mounted out there in a parking lot that could view
everything; and then we could come to court and we
could play back that camera video and see what
happened . . .
Perhaps you could see, as Livio Ramirez held
that gun directly at Jerry Wilson, ten feet away
for about one minute and then maybe we could begin
to appreciate and we could begin to understand and
we could begin to realize, the reality of the
crime. What it meant to be a victim of a violent
crime. Maybe we could begin to appreciate the
fright, the pain and the loss, and the humiliation
that went along with being a victim of a crime.
But of course, we donft have cameras like that.
But you know that doesn't stop us from
apprehending and prosecuting people who commit
such crimes. Just doesn't stop us. All across
America today there are juries just like this with
jurors just like you who have to make decisions,
not based upon cameras, but based upon the
testimony of witnesses, people who are actually
there, people who saw it with their own eyes,
people who experienced it and who come in under
oath and testify as to what happened.
I think here, we even got from the testimony,
a little bit of appreciation of what went on; a
little bit of appreciation of what it feels like
when you're a victim of the crime. Remember when
Kathy Davis testified and talked about that about
what went on? Remember her voice begin to crack?
Remember those tears that came to her eye as she
was reliving the fright, and the danger and the
pain and the violation of her safety? (R. 216 at
4-6) .
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In closing, the prosecutor commented to the jury:
The judge told you that how we choose juries is
kind of an awkward situation. Mainly, you're not
chosen, but you're kind of what is left over.
Hate to tell you that, but that's where you are,
I think we got some good people. If I had the
chance to just go out and pick the jury, I want
you and you. I tell you what I would look for. I.
would really look for people who live in my
community and who are concerned about what goes
on; concerned about the crime in this community
and concerned about the court system and would
like to be involved. I hope you are those kind of
people, because you know, I can come here the
judge can come here the defense attorney could
come here, and all the witnesses could come and do
our job. But in the final sentence what you do,
determines the success of this particular case
(R. 216 at 19-20) (emphasis added).
While counsel did not contemporaneously object to these, and other,
comments of the prosecutor during closing argument, Mr. Ramirez did
file a motion for a new trial based in part on improper closing
argument of the prosecutor, alleging inter alia that these comments
cited above purposefully incited the jury to react to the high crime
rate experienced in this and other communities across the nation,
urging them to react emotionally in responding to their duties as
jurors and to advocate the responsibility they hold to try this
particular case on the evidence alone, free from emotion and caprice.
It has been a long-standing precept of Anglo-American
jurisprudence that prosecutors not employ arguments calculated to
inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury, nor divert the jury
from its duty to decide the case on anything other than the evidence
before them.

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935); see,

also, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(c and d ) , 3-6.1(3)
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(2d ed 1980; cf. Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.4(e);
and Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-106(c)(7). The
prosecution's remarks outlined above violated this long-standing
precept and prejudiced Mr. Ramirezfs rights to a fair trial.
The other significant closing argument by the prosecutor
attacked by Mr. Ramirez on the motion for a new trial is that the
prosecutor made the following comment regarding the burden of proof
to be entertained by the jurors.

Quoting that last sentence of the

instruction in question, he argued:
"A reasonable doubt must be a real substantial
doubt and not one that's merely possible or
imaginary."
From that, I want to say two things. First of
all, the burden of proof is not beyond any doubt.
If it was beyond any doubt, we couldn't ever prove
anything could we. Just beyond a reasonable
doubt. And as you read the last sentence, before
you as a jury could come back with a not guilty
verdict, you would have to find a reasonable
doubt, based upon the evidence or lack thereof and
not just a doubt that's possible or imaginary
(R. 216 at 3) (emphasis added).
Counsel argued that this characterization of the burden of proof
standard urged by the prosecutor was in error and, while perhaps
semantically correct, realistically shifted the burden from the
State to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
to the defendant, Mr. Ramirez, to prove that a reasonable doubt
existed before the jury could return with a not guilty verdict.

In

short, the urgings by the prosecutor regarding the burden of proof
negated the long-standing recognition of the presumption of
innocence of every defendant including Mr. Ramirez, thereby
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jeopardizing his constitutionally protected rights to a fair trial.
See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 258 (1970).
Mr. Ramirez urges that one other significant comment by
the prosecutor in this case prejudiced his right to a fair trial.
This error occurred in the opening statements of the prosecutor and
did draw a contemporaneous objection and subsequent motion for a new
trial.

During the opening statement of the prosecutor, he advanced

the position that Mr. Ramirez had given an address of his uncle,
claiming to have been there earlier that evening and that the
officers checked with that uncle, finding that he had lied about
that visit.

The prosecutor stated that, at that point, Mr. Ramirez

changed his story to something altogether different.

At the

conclusion of the argument, counsel for Mr. Ramirez approached the
bench and objected to the comments during an off-the-record
discussion (R. 212 at 18-19).
Later in the day in the absence of the jury, Mr. Ramirez
renewed that objection taken at side bar and moved for a mistrial,
arguing that this particular statement or discussion had been dealt
with during the pretrial motions to suppress wherein the trial court
had ruled that such statements of the uncle were hearsay and
inadmissible (R. 212 at 79-80; R. 213 at 25-35).

Moreover, counsel

pointed out that the prosecution had failed to list this particular
uncle as a witness and therefore would be unable to present that
testimony at this trial.

Counsel further indicated that the

assertions of the prosecutor were in dispute and, without the
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testimony of the uncle, clearly left with the jurors with the
impression that Mr. Ramirez had lied about his whereabouts, thereby
reducing his credibility in front of the jury prior to the taking of
any evidence and subjecting him to the inference of commiting this
particular crime (R. 212 at 79-80).
Counsel requested that this motion for a mistrial be
considered as a continuing motion for a mistrial inasmuch as the
prosecution would be unable to produce that evidence at trial. The
trial court, however, denied counsel's motion for a mistrial without
prejudice inasmuch as the statements were made during opening
argument and the jury had been admonished that statements and
arguments of counsel were not to be considered as evidence.

The

trial court did allow Mr. Ramirez the right to renew the motion for
a mistrial at a later date (R. 212 at 80-81).

Mr. Ramirez urges the

trial court's ruling on this particular motion was in error,
demanding that the resulting conviction be reversed.

Case law

supports this position.
This Court has indicated:
The purpose of an opening statement is to advise
the jury of the facts relied upon and of the
questions and issues involved, which the jury will
have to determine, and to give them a general
picture of the facts and the situations, so that
they will be able to understand the evidence.
Counsel should outline generally what he intends
to prove, and should be allowed considerable
latitute. He should make a fair statement of the
evidence and the extent to which he may go is
largely in the discretion of the trial court. He
should not make a statement of any facts which he
cannot legally prove upon the trial; nor should he
argue the merits of his case, or relate the
testimony at length.
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State v, Erwin, 120 P.2d 285, 313 (Utah 1941) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added); accord United States v. Signer, 482 F.2d 394,
398-99 (6th Cir. 1973), and cases cited therein.

In this case, the

prosecutor's comment regarding the alleged uncle provided to the
jury information the prosecutor could not and should not otherwise
have presented at trial.

That information was damaging inasmuch as

jurors now possessed information regarding alleged inconsistent
statements offered by the defendant for his whereabouts on that
evening.

Again, this information should not have been admissible

and prejudiced Mr. Ramirez.
In State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984), this Court
reiterated the standard governing the reversal of convictions for
improper statements of the prosecutor.

The Court stated:

The test of whether the remarks made by counsel
are so objectionable as to merit reversal in a
criminal case is [1] that the remarks called to
the attention of the jurors matters which they
would not be justified in considering in
determining their verdict, and [2] were they,
under the circumstances of the particular case,
probably influenced by those remarks.
Id. at 486 (citing, inter alia, State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426
(Utah 1973).

Applying this test to Mr. Ramirez's case demonstrates

the prosecutor's misconduct in his opening statement and closing
arguments merits reversal.
The first prong of the test is met because the
prosecutor's statements called to the attention of jurors matters
which they were not entitled to consider.

Particularly the comments

in closing argument urging the jurors to emotionalize their verdict
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are contrary to the law in general and the specific instructions
given in this case (R. 133, 138, 148, 155). The comment regarding
the shift in the burden of proof also jeopardizes the reliability of
the conviction inasmuch as jurors are to be instructed by the trial
court, not counsel.

Finally, the prosecutor's comments during the

opening statement presented the jurors with information of which
they should not have been privy.

Therefore, prong one of the

Valdez-Troy standard is established:

The remarks of the prosecutor

in both opening statement and closing argument did call to the
attention of the jurors matters which they were not justified in
considering in determining their verdict in this particular case.
The second prong is equally met in this case.
overall evidence against Mr. Ramirez was very weak.
infra.

The

See Point IV,

The most critical evidence against him was the suspect

testimony of Mr. Wilson.

See Point II, supra.

Therefore, the above

comments of the prosecutor during opening statement and closing
arguments under the circumstances of this particular case did likely
influence the jurors in their ultimate outcome, tipping the balance
in an otherwise tight case in favor of conviction.

The jurors were

moved emotionally by the prosecutor in closing arguments urging them
to place themselves in the position of victims, thereby removing
them from their neutral duty as jurors.

The prosecutor's

restatement of the burden of proof standard also likely influenced
the jurors inasmuch as their outlook was then capable of being
altered to one of "before we can find the defendant not guilty, we
must find reasonable doubt" rather than the requisite "before we can
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find the defendant guilty, we must find that the State proved all
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
Finally, the presentation by the prosecutor of
inconsistent statements by Mr. Ramirez implying he lied to police
officers also likely influenced the jurors to, at a minimum,
discredit his testimony, thereby giving more weight to the witnesses
against him.

Inasmuch as both prongs of the standard governing

reversals for improper statements of the prosecutor has been met,
Mr. Ramirez urges this Court to find the remarks of the prosecutor
to be misconduct, meriting reversal of his conviction.

Therefore,

this Court should remand this case for a new trial.

POINT IV. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION OF
MR. RAMIREZ.
Mr. Ramirez maintains that the evidence adduced at trial
is unable to support the conviction of Aggravated Robbery.

He

requests this Court to examine the sufficiency of the evidence,
reverse his conviction, and remand his case to the trial court with
an order dismissing the charge against him.
In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), this
Court stated, " [ Notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the
jury's decision, this court still has the right to review the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict."

Further, the

Court noted:
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a
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reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime for which he was convicted.
Id.

This standard restates the due process requirement which

prohibits a criminal conviction in any case except upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which the defendant is charged.

Jackson v. Virginia/ 443 U.S.

307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 258 (1970).

Mr. Ramirez denied

committing the aggravated robbery in this case, thereby requiring
the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element
of that crime. While evidence existed to support that a robbery of
the Pizza Hut had occurred, insufficient evidence existed as to the
identification of the perpetrators of that crime.
The critical issue in this case was indisputably one of
identification.

Even the prosecutor conceded that the ultimate,

issue in this case was whether Mr. Ramirez was the man with the gun
(R. 212 at 18-19; R. 216 at 3-4). Despite that concession, the
State was unable to produce a sufficient quantum of evidence to
identify Mr. Ramirez as the individual who committed the crime.
Moreover, the State failed to connect Mr. Ramirez in any way with
any physical evidence which could attach him to the crime.
The most critical evidence introduced at trial against
Mr. Ramirez was the testimony of Gerald Wilson, who testified that
Mr. Ramirez was the individual who had pointed the gun at him.

The

testimony of Mr. Wilson, however, is inherently suspect due to the
suggestive nature employed by police officers during the showup
procedures (see Point II, supra) as well as the testimony itself
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when compared against governing case law in this jurisdiction.

In

particular, this Court has recognized various evils inherent in
eyewitness identification which require rejecting as unreliable the
testimony of Mr. Wilson.

In State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 489-91

(Utah 1986), this Court outlined numerous problems both potential
and real with the human memory process and with the ability of
witnesses to accurately recall events.

This Court pointed out that:

[r]esearch has also undermined the common notion
that the confidence with which an individual makes
an identification is a valid indicator of the
accuracy of the recollection. In fact, the
accuracy of an identification is at times
inversely related to the confidence with which it
is made.
721 P.2d at 490 (citations omitted).

This recognition by this Court

directly applies to the testimony of Mr. Wilson.

The certainty of

his identification of Mr. Ramirez as the Pizza Hut gunman is
contrary to the majority of the indicators analyzed by the Court in
State v. Long.

Further, the factual peculiarities of this case

discount the accuracy of Mr. Wilson's testimony in any event.
Of the three victims involved in this case, only
Mr. Wilson was able to identify Mr. Ramirez as the gunman.

The

State urged at trial that Mr. Wilson was the only individual that
had a clear view of the gunman inasmuch as he studied the gunman for
nearly one minute while the gunman pointed his weapon at
Mr. Wilson.

However, Mr. Wilson was occupied during that time as he

was defending at least two blows from the man with the pipe and was
also concerned for his sister being forced to re-enter the Pizza
Hut.

Further, the other two witnesses, Kathy Davis and her husband,
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John Davis, testified that the view of the gunman was difficult at
best.

Both witnesses testified that despite good lighting in the

parking lot of the Pizza Hut, the gunman was actually in the shadows
near the corner of the building.

The descriptions given by all

three witnesses support this characterization of the facts by Mr.
and Mrs. Davis inasmuch as the descriptions of the gunman were
generic at best.
Two descriptions of the gunman were provided to Officer
Travis immediately after the robbery.

Mr. Davis testified that the

second suspect was from eighteen to nineteen years old, five feet
six inches tall, slender, brown eyes, Levis, white bandana over his
face, and wearing a red and white cap.

Mr. Wilson described the man

with the gun as a male Mexican, five feet nine inches to six feet
tall, wearing a blue sweater and Levis, and with a white scarf
across his face.
Mr. Ramirez is five feet ten inches tall.
hundred sixty pounds.

He weighs one

He is an Apache Indian with some Spanish

heritage and he wears his hair shoulder length due to his Indian
religion.

He has worn his hair the same for five years.

He has

three tattoos on his arm—a rose, an "L" and a little drummer
boy—which are all visible when wearing his sleeveless sweatshirt.
On August 13, 1987, Mr. Ramirez was wearing Levis and a dark blue
sweatshirt with cut-off sleeves with paint splattered all over the
front of it.

He was also wearing a brown baseball cap.

As Mr. Wilson proceeded through the criminal process, his
testimony became more accurate and more assured that Mr. Ramirez was
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the gunman in this case.

That occurrence parallels the analysis of

this Court discussing the inherent danger of eyewitness testimony.
It is noteworthy that Mr. Wilson, though claiming to see the gunman
for between seconds and nearly one minute, did not indicate three
peculiarities of Mr. Ramirez readily discernable.

First, Mr. Wilson

made no comment of the tattoos on Mr. Ramirez's upper arm until his
testimony presented at trial.

Second, Mr. Wilson made no

observation that the sweat shirt (originally described by him as a
sweater) of Mr. Ramirez was covered across the front with large
spots of paint.

Third, Mr. Wilson made no observation of the

shoulder-length hair of the gunman which also would have been
readily discernable.

Contrasting the description of the gunman

originally given by Mr. Wilson with his more precise and detailed
description of the man with the pipe, to wit:

one front tooth

missing and bald spot on side of head, further suggests Mr. Wilson's
testimony identifying Mr. Ramirez as the gunman is inaccurte and
unreliable.
Also important to note is that Mr. Wilson's testimony
only became more sure and more detailed after the repeated and
extended observations of Mr. Ramirez during the criminal justice
process itself, the showup, the preliminary hearing, and ultimately
the trial.

Accordingly, Mr. Wilson's identification testimony, when

checked against this Court's opinion in State v. Long which
recognized the inherent problems in eyewitness testimony, is suspect
and should have been discredited by the jury and, on review, must be
rejected by this Court.

As acknowledged in State v. Long, empirical
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evidence documents the unreliability of eyewitness testimony with
countless studies "all leadfing] inexoribly to the conclusion that
human perception is inexact and that human memory is both limited
and fallible."

Ij3. at 488. An additional observation by this Court

supports the need for this Court to reject the testimony of
Mr. Wilson where the jurors did not.
[P]erhaps it is precisely because jurors do not
appreciate the fallibility of eyewitness testimony
that they give such testimony great weight. In
one notable study involving a simulated trial, 18%
of the jurors voted to convict the defendant when
there were no eyewitnesses to the crime. However,
when a credible eyewitness was presented, 72%
voted to convict. And surprisingly even when
presented with an eyewitness who was quite
thoroughly discredited by counsel, a full 68%
still voted to convict.
Id. at 490 (citations omitted).
Understanding the suspect nature of Mr. Wilson's
testimony and the inherent problems of eyewitness testimony in
general, this Court must recognize that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that Mr. Ramirez was correctly
identified as the gunman of the armed robbery of the Redwood Road
Pizza Hut.

Moreover, when contrasting the weaknesses in the

identification of Mr. Wilson with the suggestive nature utilized in
obtaining that testimony (see Point II, supra), this Court should
recognize as a matter of law that the identification testimony of
Mr. Wilson is unable and insufficient to sustain the conviction of
Mr. Ramirez.

This Court should therefore reverse the conviction for

insufficiency of the evidence and remand the case with an order to
dismiss the charge against him.
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CONCLUSION
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Ramirez
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the conviction of
Armed Robbery and order that the trial court either dismiss the
charges against him or grant a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this c^f>JJ day of April, 1989.
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